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WHAT RECENT COURT CASES INDICATE ABOUT
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE WORKPLACE: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT THE NEED FOR A SUPREME

COURT RULING ON THE ISSUE
Rosanna McCalipst
I. INTRODUCTION
With the number of linguistic minorities and bilingual citizens on the
rise,, so too are tensions regarding the use of languages other than English
in the workplace. There is a great divide among academics, employers and
the courts regarding the validity of English-only workplace rules under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Recent cases dealing with
English-only workplace rules indicate the need for a Supreme Court ruling
with respect to various issues, as circuit splits exist in numerous areas.
Two of these controversial and closely related issues will be examined in
this comment. First, there is a circuit split regarding the proper deference
to be given to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines
regarding Title VII. Second, there is a split of authority regarding whether,
for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly Title VII,
classification or discrimination on the basis of language equates with
national origin discrimination. In other words, does language implicate
t J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1999, the
Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author only and do not reflect the views of any other individual, fnrm
or entity.
1. As of the 1990 U.S. Census, 31,844,979 U.S. citizens spoke a language other than
English at home. Of them, 4,826,958 spoke English "not well" and 1,845,243 did not speak
English at all. The largest linguistic population was Spanish speakers with 17,339,172
people speaking Spanish in the home. See Table 5, Detailed Language Spoken at Home and
Ability to Speak English for Person, United States 1990, available at
http:/www.census.gov/populationlsocdemollanguageltable5.txt (Dec. 28, 2000).
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national origin? Based on recent psycho-linguistic studies, at least one
court has found that various phenomena such as code switching and the
most recently spoken language phenomenon, psycho-linguistic concepts
that will be discussed more fully later, subject members of different
national origins to anxieties and discomfort that native English speakers do
not experience, such that language should be equated with national origin.2
This is a recent trend, however, as many, if not most, courts find that
language is simply not the same thing as national origin.3
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful to
discriminate in the terms or conditions of employment based on one's race,
religion, sex or national origin. There are two ways a plaintiff can prevail.
Either the plaintiff can prove disparate treatment, meaning the employer
intentionally discriminated on the basis of one of the protected grounds, or
disparate impact, meaning a seemingly neutral employment practice puts
an undue burden on members of a protected class.' While some Englishonly policies have been challenged on disparate treatment grounds,6 the
EEOC regulations are directed toward disparate impact claims and this
2. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex.
2000).
3. E.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
bilingual employees did not make out a prima facie case and that Spun Steak has not
violated Title VII in adopting an English-only rule), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994);
Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that the
church's English-only rule did not amount to national origin discrimination under Title VII);
Prado v. Luria, 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that an English-only workplace
policy did not amount to national origin discrimination); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va.,
894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that an English-only workplace policy did not
constitute national origin discrimination against employees of Hispanic origin), aff'd
without opinion 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) reported in full at 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
12431 (4th Cir. 1996).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001). The relevant text of Title VII provides as follows:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
origin;
or
color,
religion,
sex,
or
national
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
§2000e-2.
5. E.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (noting that "it is well established under Title VII that claims of employment
discrimination because of race may arise in two different ways").
6. E.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenging English
only policy on both disparate treatment and disparate impact grounds).
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paper will focus on that type of challenge. The disparate impact analysis
was first set out by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 7 From
that case and the decisions of various courts interpreting the holding, a
burden shifting analysis has emerged. There are three steps to the
analysis.' First, the plaintiff must establish that the policy in question has a
disparate impact on a protected class. 9 Next the employer must defend the
policy by proffering a legitimate business purpose for it. Last, the plaintiff
can still prevail if it shows there is a less discriminatory method by which
the legitimate business goal can be obtained. 0
Consistent with the Griggs test, in order to prevail under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), the plaintiff must show that the employer "uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Congress has given the
EEOC the power to interpret, administer, and enforce Title VII." Pursuant
to that authority, and in order to assist the plaintiff in making out a prima
facie case, the EEOC has established guidelines with respect to Englishonly policies that provide for an inference of disparate impact once the
existence of such a policy has been shown. 2 As a result of this
presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show a
legitimate business justification for the policy. This burden-shifting is the
central importance of the rule because it makes it much easier for a plaintiff
to survive a motion for summary judgment and actually reach a trial on the
merits in the case where an employer has not yet proffered a legitimate
business reason for the policy. If there is such a reason, the employer can
show that reason at trial and still successfully defend the policy.
Like many presumptions, the EEOC guidelines place the burden of
production on the party most able to bear it, in this case the employer,
because of the party's greater access to information. The federal regulation
provides that an English-only policy applied at all times is presumed to be a
burdensome term or condition of employment and thus constitutes national
origin discrimination. 3 This guideline has the effect of shifting the burden
under Griggs to the employer to proffer a legitimate business purpose for
the policy. Nonetheless, many courts have rejected this guideline and have
forced the plaintiff to provide other extrinsic evidence of a disparate
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Furnco Constr., 438 U.S. at 583 (discussing the burden shifting analysis for
disparate impact claims).

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2001) (giving the EEOC "authority from time to time to
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this

subchapter").
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2000).
13. Id.
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impact.' 4 While this obviously makes it much more difficult for a plaintiff
to survive summary judgment, let alone prevail in a trial on the merits,
recent psycho-linguistic expert testimony has helped plaintiffs to do just
that in at least one case.15
In EEOC v. Premier Operator,6 a case that will be examined in
greater detail in Part III, a district court in the Fifth Circuit, a circuit which
had traditionally rejected the theory of language as implicating national
origin, 17 relied heavily on such expert testimony to find that the Englishonly policy did disparately impact non-English native speakers in violation
of Title VII. This conflict underscores the need for a Supreme Court ruling
on the proper deference to be given to EEOC guidelines in general and to
the guidelines governing English-only policies in particular. Such a ruling
would clarify the jurisprudence by resolving the question of whether Title
VII envisions language as implicating national origin.
II.

DEFERENCE To EEOC GUIDELINES?

As discussed above, the EEOC guidelines aid the plaintiff in making
out a prima facie case of disparate impact.1 8 Therefore, an important issue
in the debate over English-only workplace rules is whether the EEOC
guidelines dealing with such policies are entitled to deference. The proper
standard for deference to the EEOC's Title VII guidelines was established
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.9 The Court held that Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody ° established that, although Congress did not confer upon the
EEOC the authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to Title
VII,21 the Commission's guidelines are entitled to some deference. 22 The3
Court cited approvingly to the reasoning of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,2
where it characterized the import of such interpretive rulings as follows:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
14. Long v. First Union Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730
(E.D. Pa. 1998); Prado v. L. Luria & Sons, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
15. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
16. Id.
17. E.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (provided a holding decided
before the promulgation of 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7).
18. While some English-only cases have been argued on both disparate treatment
grounds, e.g. Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), this paper focuses on
disparate impact claims as the EEOC guidelines in question address that theory.
19. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
20. 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
21. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141.
22. Id.
23. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
24
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
The Court adopted the "power to persuade" approach and analyzed the
EEOC guideline in question accordingly.25
Most recently, the Court dealt with the issue of deference to agency
guidelines that do not have the force of law in Christensen v. Harris
County. The Court noted that interpretations contained in opinion letters,
policy statements, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines all lack the
force of law and do not warrant so-called "Chevron-style" deference.2 In
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2
addressing an Environmental Protection Agency regulation implementing
permit requirements under the Clean Air Act of 1977, the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which had set
aside the EPA standard. The Court held:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 29
While Chevron style deference to substantive statutory interpretations
by the EEOC under Title VII is not appropriate, some EEOC guidelines are
entitled to a certain amount of deference. What is unclear and subject to
much debate, however, is whether the particular EEOC guidelines relating
to English-only workplace rules, namely 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7, are entitled to
any deference. Logically it seems that, in line with the reasoning from
Skidmore, the guidelines should be given deference as they were
promulgated by an agency with vast experience after a notice and comment
period in which the agency received approximately 250 comments. °
The EEOC guidelines regarding English-only policies in the
workplace that are applied at all times provide that such policies create a
presumption of discrimination, such that the plaintiff can establish a prima

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 140.
Gilbert,429 U.S. at 140-46.
529 U.S. 576, 631 (2000).
Id.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843-44.
45 Fed. Reg. 85, 632 (1980).
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facie case of disparate impact without proof beyond the existence and
implementation of such policies.3" Once the plaintiff introduces evidence
of such a policy affecting him or her, the burden then shifts to the
defendant employer to supply a legitimate business necessity for the
English-only policy. Then, for disparate impact claims, the plaintiff may
show that other less discriminatory methods of attaining the same
legitimate business goal existed. While some courts give the administrative
guidelines great deference,32 other courts substitute their own reasoning and
reject the EEOC guidelines.3 3
Courts that reject the EEOC guidelines place the initial burden on the
plaintiff to prove the English-only policy actually created a disparate
impact for her and other similarly situated employees. 4 Until recently,
many plaintiffs were unable to convince courts that English-only policies
create more of a hardship for them than for monolingual English speakers
because many courts held that language use is a deliberate choice.35 Recent
psycho-linguistic evidence, which will be discussed further in Part III,
indicates that language use is not always a deliberate choice. The EEOC
seems to have been aware of this fact when it promulgated 29 C.F.R. §
1606.7, which was likely based on its vast experience in the area, even if
the science was not there to back it up in 1980. The EEOC notes in the
guideline: "It is common for individuals whose primary language is not
English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their
primary language. 3 6 If courts would defer to the EEOC guideline, this
same psycho-linguistic evidence would not have to be presented over and
over again. Instead, the plaintiff would be able to survive summary
judgment, forcing the employer to show the legitimate business reasons for
the policy, a showing that should be easy for him to make if such a
legitimate purpose truly exists. As Judge Reinhardt points out in his
dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial of en banc review of the Spun Steak
opinion, presumptions are often used in employment discrimination cases
as a way for the courts to take notice of findings by agencies with much
greater expertise in the areas involved than the courts themselves and to
avoid presentation of the same proof over and over again.37 Judge

31. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2000).
32. E.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill.
1999)
(holding that the EEOC guideline, providing that the employer's English-only rule violates
Title VII unless the employer can establish a business necessity for the rule, comports with
requirements for a viable Title VII claim).
33. E.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
34. E.g., Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
35. E.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1480.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (c) (emphasis added).
37. Garciav. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Reinhardt describes what he calls the majority's "most incomprehensible
interpretation of this common practice:
In effect, the majority holds that the agency is without authority
to determine that English-only rules and similar discriminatory
practices are invalid generally. The majority apparently believes
that the question of the validity of a widespread discriminatory
practice must be decided over and over again on a case by case
basis in a private lawsuit each time a new employer adopts it.
The majority's remarkably narrow view of the EEOC's authority
is reminiscent of courts of the 1930s which refused to accept
agency findings regarding labor and food standards. 39

35

The majority completely ignores the fact that courts often rely upon
the EEOC, as well as other agencies like it, because of its extensive
experience with discriminatory employment practices. As Judge Reinhardt
notes, the EEOC guidelines exist precisely so that issues such as whether
an English-only policy disparately impacts groups of employees based
upon their national origin do not have to be litigated time and time again.40
Despite the common evidentiary practice of using presumptions to shift the
burden of proof, numerous courts have nonetheless rejected this particular
presumption because they feel it relieves the plaintiff of her burden of
proof in the disparate impact analysis. 4 ' Hence, a ruling by the Supreme
Court upholding the EEOC guidelines because of the EEOC's expertise
and authority in this area would clarify the burden scheme for all such
disparate impact Title VII claims based on English-only policies and would
create consistency in our nation's courts regarding this highly controversial
issue.
There is also an unresolved issue regarding interpretation of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7. The EEOC guidelines were issued in response to the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Garcia v. Gloor, finding that an English-only policy
that prohibited the employees from speaking Spanish at all times unless
dealing with a Spanish-speaking customer did not have a disparate impact
on the basis of national origin.42 Under 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7, an Englishonly workplace rule creates a presumption of disparate impact on the basis
of national origin. A sub-issue of interpretation is whether 29 C.F.R. §
1606.7(b), in addition to § 1606.7(a), also carries with it a presumption
that, in the absence of other proof, the existence of an English-only policy

38. Id. at 299.
39. Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying partly
on the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in disparate impact cases to reject the
EEOC guidelines).
42. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,272 (5th Cir. 1980).
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establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact. Subsection (b) refers to
English-only policies that are not implemented at all times, such as on
lunch breaks, but are implemented only at certain times, such as when
performing work-related tasks. Some courts have treated the EEOC
guidelines as not carrying such a presumption with respect to English-only
policies that fall under subsection (b).43 Other courts, however, seem to
treat both sections of the EEOC guideline as creating a presumption of
44
disparate impact once an English-only policy is shown to exist.

As stated above, while the EEOC does have rule-making authority, it
does not make law. Therefore, while EEOC guidelines, as well as the
guidelines of other administrative agencies, are entitled to considerable
deference, they need not be followed by the courts if there are compelling
reasons to believe that the guidelines are wrong.46 Most courts that have
dealt with the issue of English-only policies in the workplace have declined
to give any deference to the EEOC guideline.47 These courts have instead
required the plaintiff to prove a disparate impact before the analysis is
moved to the second stage in which the defendant employer must proffer a
legitimate business necessity for the English-only policy. For example, the
court in Garciav. Spun Steak declined to adhere to the EEOC guidelines on
the basis of its belief that the EEOC overstepped its authority in adopting
guidelines that the court found to be inconsistent with the plain language of

43. See Tran v. Standard Motor, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210 n.17 (D. Kan. 1998)
(declining to consider whether deference to the EEOC guidelines should be given as "there
is no evidence.., that defendant Standard's purported English-only policy was applied at
all times"). See also Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995),
aff'd 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the EEOC "presumes that an employer's
English-only rule is national origin discrimination if the rule is enforced at all times, but
permits such a rule provided that it is enforced only at certain times, is justified by business
necessity and adequate notice is provided").
44. See EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 n.7 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (noting that the court will consider the English-only policy under subsection (b) of the
EEOC regulation, but still finding that the existence of an English-only policy creates a
presumption of disparate impact). See also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1489, 1490
(9th Cir. 1993) (citing the dissenting opinion to 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) for support of the
proposition that the EEOC guidelines shift the burden to the defendant once an English-only
policy is shown to exist).
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See also Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976) (establishing the standard level of deference to
administrative guidelines as the "power to persuade," a determination made by considering
various factors). But see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (holding an
administrative guideline is entitled to deference unless "there are 'compelling indications
that it is wrong"').
46. Espinoza,414 U.S. at 94.
47. Long, 86 F.3d at 1151; Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1480; Kania v. Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F.
Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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§ 703(a) of Title VII found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 4 8 This section
provides that it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate in the
terms and conditions of employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. This is the section of Title VII that has been read to
give rise to the disparate impact claim. Further, the court in Spun Steak
believed the guidelines were inconsistent with some of the legislative
history of Title VII, which indicates that Congress intended to strike a
balance between eliminating discrimination
and preserving private control
4 9
of business when it passed Title VII.
In fact, since the adoption of the EEOC guidelines shortly after the
decision in Garcia v. Gloor, no federal Court of Appeals has yet adopted
them, while various ones have declined to defer to them. 0 In the past two
years, however, at least two district courts have deferred to the EEOC
guidelines and have rejected the defendant employer's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had not stated a prima facie case
of disparate impact on the basis of national origin. In EEOC v. SynchroStart Products, Inc.,51 EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc.,5 2 and
Roman v. Cornell University,5 the courts deferred to the EEOC guidelines.
While the parties in Synchro-Startand Roman have since settled, such that
there will be no review of the case by the Seventh or Second Circuit Courts
of Appeal, if Premier is reviewed and affirmed on appeal by the Fifth
Circuit, that would create a circuit split between two of the circuits with
large minority populations, the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,54 as well
as between the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit*5 Further, it would be
in opposition to the holdings in5 various
district courts in other circuits such
7
56
as the Third and the Eleventh.

Even without the affirmation of an appeals court, the courts of this
nation are clearly divided as to the deference they are to give to the EEOC
guidelines regarding English-only rules in the workplace. A ruling from
the Supreme Court on this highly controversial issue could greatly
streamline the review of cases such as these where English-only policies
are challenged. The Supreme Court should clarify whether the EEOC
48. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (stating that "[n]othing in the plain language of
section 703(a)(1) supports EEOC's English-only rule Guideline").
49. Id. at 1490.
50. Long v. First Union Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996); Garciav. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d at 1490; Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Prado, 975 F. Supp. at 1349.
51. 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. 1l 1999).
52. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
53. 53 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
54. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (concluding that the courts are "not bound by the
guidelines").
55. Long, 86 F.3d at 1151.
56. Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
57. Prado v. L. Luria & Sons, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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acted within or went beyond the scope of the power conferred upon it by
Congress when it enacted 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7, which declares that Englishonly policies create a presumption of a disparate impact based on national
origin.
The benefit of a ruling declaring that the EEOC guidelines are proper,
and thus should be followed, would be to relieve the plaintiff of the
difficult burden of presenting evidence to prove disparate impact. As with
other evidentiary burdens that have been given the benefit of a
presumption, the evidence necessary to sustain such a burden might
otherwise be extremely difficult for the plaintiff to provide. As Judge
Boochever wrote in his dissent from the majority's rejection of the EEOC
guidelines in Spun Steak, "proof of such an effect of English-only rules
requires analysis of subjective factors. It is hard to envision how the
burden of proving such an effect would be met other than by conclusory
self-serving statements of the Spanish-speaking employees or possibly by
expert testimony of psychologists.""8 The EEOC was clearly aware of this
problem and therefore provided a remedy in the form of a rebuttable
presumption. While this presumption is not conclusive proof of a Title VII
violation, it at least gets the plaintiff before the jury with the triable issue of
fact, for example the validity of the employer's proffered business
justification. If the employer did indeed implement the English-only policy
out of business necessity rather than out of animosity for a certain ethnic or
linguistic group, then there will be no Title VII violation. The existence of
a presumption that satisfies the plaintiffs need to establish a prima facie
case does not change this fact. In fact, the primary purpose of any
evidentiary presumption is to aid the party with the burden in carrying that
burden, as Judge Reinhardt pointed out in Spun Steak.59 Then, instead of
wasting judicial resources litigating the same issue with the same expert
testimony over and over again, the courts could move quickly to the
dispositive and case-specific issue of whether or not the employer has a
legitimate business necessity for the policy.
The basis for a ruling that the EEOC guidelines should be followed
could well come from recent psycho-linguistic studies that have established
the link between language and national origin. By crediting these experts
through embracing the EEOC guideline that has as its premise the belief
that language implicates national origin, the Supreme Court would remove
the need to cover the same psychological and linguistic ground in every
single case. Instead of forcing plaintiffs to bring in experts to show the link
between language and national origin every time they allege national origin
discrimination on the basis of an English-only policy, the EEOC guidelines

58. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1489 at 1490.
59. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1993).
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would do away with this phase of the trial and would focus the fact-finding
on the legitimacy of the employer's proffered business justification.
Various recent district court cases suggest that the courts are coming to this
conclusion on their own based on expert testimony. 60 Whereas former
courts have rejected the link between language and national origin based on
the "axiomatic" principle that language use is a preference, a volitional
choice that breaks the link to national origin,6' more recently courts have
benefited from the testimony of psycho-linguistic experts who have shown
that this is simply not the case. Part I addresses this issue and the
findings that, as of late, have convinced at least two circuit courts to defer
to the EEOC guidelines, which provide that language does indeed implicate
national origin.
Ill. DOES LANGUAGE IMPLICATE NATIONAL ORIGIN?
Inherent in the EEOC guidelines is the belief that Title VII envisions
language as implicating national origin. Nonetheless, courts that have
rejected the EEOC guidelines have tended to also reject the theory that
discrimination based on language is the same thing as national origin
discrimination and have largely upheld English-only policies as not
violating Title VII. While scholars can debate whether language is an
important part of one's identity, psycho-linguists have made findings that
suggest that the language one speaks can subject him or her to disparate
conditions in the workplace, such that, for Title VII purposes, language
discrimination does indeed result in disparate impact along national origin
lines. Historically, most courts have rejected the link between language
and national origin.62 In at least one case, however, the court has placed
great weight on these studies and upheld the link.63 In the early 1990's the
courts that considered the link between language and national origin6 4
rejected it based on their belief that the language one spoke was a choice.
60. E.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex.
2000); Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D.P.R. 1992) (recognizing bilingualism
as ratified by the constitution in Puerto Rico as part of its national origin).
61. E.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (stating that "it is axiomatic that an employee
must sacrifice self-expression during work hours"); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th
Cir. 1980) (stating that "there is no disparate impact if the rule is one that affected
employees can readily observe and non-observance is a matter of personal preference").
62. Long v. First Union Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at
1480; Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Prado v. L.
Luria & Sons, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
63. Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
64. E.g., Vialez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
that an English-only policy was fair because of the nation's general reliance upon English,
despite plaintiff's evidence that many tenants of the Housing Authority were Hispanic and
non-English speaking, and thus suffered hardship under the policy).
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While they recognized that selectively enforcing such a policy in order to
discriminate against a certain group of people, for example Hispanics,
while allowing other employees to speak a language other than English
would indeed violate Title VII, they refused to hold that the mere existence
of such a policy without explicit discriminatory enforcement constituted
national origin discrimination. 65
In Garciav. Gloor, the court wrote, "Mr. Garcia was fully bilingual.
He chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead of English while actually at
work., 66 Hence, the court in Gloor and other courts have found that
because the employees who were bilingual could easily comply with the
rule, there was no disparate impact. The court in Spun-Steak also rested its
decision on this line of reasoning. The court relied on the decision in
Garciav. Gloor in holding that the English-only policy in question did not
have a disparate impact on bilingual employees. Citing to Gloor the court
stated, "It is axiomatic that 'the language a person who is multi-lingual
elects to speak at a particular time is... a matter of choice.' 67 In fact the
court stated that "we fail to see the relevance of the assertion" that
switching between languages is not fully volitional for bilingual employees
and therefore denies them a privilege of employment that monolingual
English speakers enjoy.68
These cases have established the precedent in their circuits and have
been followed approvingly by district courts in circuits where the appellate
court has not yet ruled on the matter. For example, the court in Kania v.
69
Archdiocese of Philadelphia,
writing on a clean slate in the Third Circuit,
cited with approval to Gloor and Spun Steak Co. in reaching the conclusion
that the EEOC guidelines regarding English-only workplace rules should
not be followed and that the policy in question did not violate Title VII.70
Since the plaintiff in Kania was bilingual, the court found as follows:
"[b]ecause she could have readily complied with the English-only rule, it
did not cause a legally cognizable adverse impact upon the terms and
conditions of her employment. Accordingly, Kania has failed to prove that
the defendants engaged in national origin discrimination as a matter of
law."7' As these cases illustrate, even in the mid to late 1990's courts still
believed that language was a choice and used this rationale to support their
holdings that English-only workplace rules did not have a disparate impact
on bilingual speakers.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

E.g., Long, 86 F.3d at 1151.
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
Spun-Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (citing to Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
Id. at 1488.
14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 733-736 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Id. at 735-736.
Id. at 736 (internal citations omitted).
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Nonetheless, not all courts were adhering to the argument that
language was a mutable characteristic. At least one court in the early
1990's recognized the immutable nature of language. Smothers v. Benitez
involved a suit by an English-speaking teacher in Puerto Rico who
challenged the Puerto Rico Department of Education's policy of
administering its certification exams only in Spanish. 72 The plaintiff wrote
the essay portion of her examination in English. 3 The examination was not
graded and it was invalidated as a result.74 The plaintiff challenged the
policy on equal protection grounds. The court, in denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, found that an issue of fact existed on the
question of national origin discrimination. 75 The court did not decide what
level of scrutiny the language policy merited. It did however recognize that
if language was used to deprive members of a protected class of a
fundamental right, it could fall under the category of strict scrutiny. 76 In
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized the fact that language had
not yet been established as implicating national origin for discrimination
purposes: "The difficulty in treating plaintiffs equal protection claim lies
in the fact that language use by minority language groups has not yet been
situated within the framework of legal standards which control the
77
application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Further, the court recognized the fact that language is not necessarily a
choice: "While language can be considered a mutable characteristic, it has
immutable aspects. New languages can be learned and old ones forgotten;
however, the knowledge of a language, insofar as it is an ethnic
characteristic leaves identifiable traces like accents, surnames and behavior
patterns. 78 The court even recognized in a footnote that for some people,
language is not a mutable characteristic. 79 The court cited to an article that
relies on studies that suggest that for some immigrants, language is
immutable because they are incapable of learning a new language.0 The
court used this rationale to reach the holding that language could implicate
the protected class of national origin and require strict scrutiny for equal
protection purposes."
Despite a few contrary holdings, the vast majority of courts in the
early 1990's, however, continued to hold that use of a particular language
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D.P.R. 1992).
Id. at301.
Id.
Id. at310.
Id. at 306.
Id. 305 (D.P.R. 1992).
Id. at 306.
Id. at306n.10.
Id. at 306.
Id. at308.
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was a conscious, mutable choice.12 Two lines of attack developed in order
to undermine this logic. First, some plaintiffs and courts have attacked the
"easily comply" rationale as inadequate.8 3 The Supreme Court has
indicated that with respect to Equal Protection analysis, heightened scrutiny
is only appropriate where classification is made based on an immutable
characteristic. s4 With respect to Tile VII, however, this mutable/immutable
distinction breaks down as Congress enumerates religion as a protected
class, notwithstanding the fact that religion is clearly mutable. In the
English-only context, at least one judge has attacked the mutability
argument. Judge Reinhardt wrote in his dissent from the denial of a
rehearing en banc for Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. that focusing on the ease
with which one can comply with a discriminatory policy simply misses the
point of Title VII:
Whether or not the employees can readily comply with a
discriminatory rule is by no means the measure of whether they
suffer significant adverse consequences.
Some of the most
objectionably discriminatory rules are the least obtrusive in terms
of one's ability to comply; being required to sit in the back of a
bus, for example; or being relegated during one's law school
career to a portion of the classroom dedicated to one's exclusive
85

use.

Judge Reinhardt went on in his opinion to present commentary from
writers who examined the link between language and cultural identity and
found that for many bilinguals, language is a critical part of their identity.
Further, recently, psycho-linguistic evidence has come to light indicating
language use is not always a deliberate choice. This expert testimony is the
second way in which the "easily comply" theory has been attacked.
In the past two years, courts considering challenges to English-only
workplace rules have benefited from the testimony of linguistic experts.
This testimony makes it impossible to deny that language is not simply a
matter of choice but rather it is the result of psychological and linguistic
phenomena that make complying with English-only policies burdensome
for some bilingual speakers. Because this difficulty in complying subjects
bilingual employees to a greater risk of discharge and feelings of
inferiority, isolation and discomfort, at least one district court has found
82. E.g., Vialez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
83. E.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D.
Tex. 2000).
84. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, for example Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion,
agreed with the majority that racial classifications should be assessed under the strict
scrutiny and noted that "immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual
merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision." 448 U.S. 448, 496
(1980).
85. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993).
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that English-only policies do have a disparate impact along national origin
lines. 16
In EEOC v. Premier OperatorServices, Inc., the court relied heavily
on the expert testimony of Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, professor of linguistics
and Hispanic language and culture at the University of Pittsburgh. Dr.
Berk-Seligson testified that adhering to an English-only policy is not
simply a matter of preference and can be virtually impossible in many
She testified about two linguistic
cases for bilingual speakers.81
phenomena known as "code-switching" and the most recently spoken
According to Dr. Berk-Seligson, the codelanguage phenomenon.
switching phenomenon was discovered by psycho-linguists in the late
1990's. Code-switching is the phenomenon where "[b]ilinguals whose
original language is a language other than English unconsciously switch
from English to their original or primary language when speaking
informally with fellow members of their cultural group." 8 As Dr. BerkSeligson noted, this code-switching can occur between sentences or even
within sentences.8 9
A second phenomenon to which Dr. Berk-Seligson testified is the
most recently spoken language phenomenon. According to Dr. BerkSeligson, bilingual speakers will tend to automatically continue to speak in
the language in which they were previously conversing.9" For example, a
bilingual employee who deals with customers in both English and Spanish
may continue to speak Spanish with co-workers after servicing a client in
Spanish in violation of an English-only rule. This phenomenon further
undermines the theory that bilingual employees voluntarily choose to
converse in Spanish in violation of the English-only policy. This testimony
was particularly apposite in Premier since the occupation in question in
that case was that of long-distance telephone operator, the job requirements
of which involved regular communication with customers in Spanish. 91
From this expert testimony, the court concluded that as a matter of law
the English-only policy disparately impacted bilingual employees because
of their national origin. The disparate impact posed by the policy was the

86. Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
87. Id. at 1070.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In fact, it was a job qualification that the applicant be bilingual in English and
Spanish: "The recruitment and hiring of the class members was based or conditioned upon
their bilingual ability, and in particular, their ability to speak Spanish because of a need for
Defendant's business to service Spanish-speaking customers." Premier,113 F. Supp. 2d at
1068. This fact exemplifies the irony in many of these cases where employees who are
originally hired based on their ability to speak Spanish or another foreign language are later
discharged as a result of psycho-linguistic phenomena associated with their bilingual ability.
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"very real risk of being reprimanded or even losing their jobs if they
violated the English-only rule, even if such non-compliance was
inadvertent. 92 Further, the court found that denying a bilingual employee
the ability to alternate between Spanish and English in informal
conversations "not only makes the individual feel uncomfortable, but is
tantamount to intimidating him or her and being punitive with such
constraint."93 The import of this finding for Title VII purposes is that other
employees of different national origin and linguistic backgrounds did not
face this same risk. 94 Therefore, the English-only policy created a disparate
impact on a class of employees based upon their national origin, which
constitutes a violation of Title VII. As the Premier court found, the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case and the burden then shifted to
the defendant to prove a legitimate business necessity for the policy. 95 The
Premiercourt found that the defendant did not carry its burden on the issue
of business necessity and ruled for the plaintiff, awarding $650,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages. 96
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE WITH RESPECT TO

LANGUAGE As IMPLICATING NATIONAL ORIGIN.

The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether language implicates
national origin. The Court has, however, considered the issue in dictum on
a few occasions. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Sandoval points out
dicta from various cases suggesting that the Court recognizes the close link
between language and national origin. 97 One example is Hernandez v. New
York where, although the parties briefed the issue and the Court discussed
it, the Court declined to rule on the issue. 98 Hernandez involved
peremptory challenges to jurors based on the prosecutor's belief that the
potential jurors would have trouble crediting the official translation of
testimony in Spanish because the jurors were fluent in Spanish and would
understand the original testimony when given in Spanish. The Court held
that the peremptory challenges were Constitutional because the prosecutor
based his challenges on conduct during voir dire that led him to believe the
witness would have trouble crediting the official translation of Spanish
language testimony. The Court found that this was not a violation of the
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. For purposes of Title VII, national origin refers to the country "where a person was
born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (emphasis added).
95. Premierat 1077.
96. Id. at 1078.
97. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
98. 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
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Equal Protection Clause: "Each category would include both Latinos and
non-Latinos. While the prosecutor's criterion might well result in the
disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate
removal does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." 99
The Supreme Court also dealt briefly with a case that specifically
involved English-only workplace rules. The Court, vacating as moot the
order of the Ninth Circuit in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, which adopted the EEOC
guidelines, found an English-only workplace rule to have a disparate
impact and issued a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant
employer from requiring its employees to communicate only in English. 10
Some courts and the amicus curiae in the Sandoval case rely on this as
support for their holdings or assertions that language as implicating
national origin has no support in judicial precedent. 1 This reliance is illconceived, however, because the decision in Gutierrezwas vacated because
the employee petitioner had switched jobs, and therefore, the injunction
issued by the Ninth Circuit was no longer necessary. Thus, the Supreme
Court's order is not relevant to the underlying question concerning the
EEOC's guideline on whether English-only rules create a disparate impact
based on national origin.
The Court's most recent foray into this area came when it granted
certiorari in Alexander v. Sandoval,102 a case from the Eleventh Circuit
regarding English-only policies of state government agencies. This case
could have resolved the issue of whether language implicates national
origin. The Court, however, decided the case on a different ground,
holding that there is no private cause of action under Title VT.10 3 The Court
never reached the issue of whether language implicates national origin for
purposes of the Civil Rights Act. While the case did not resolve the
question, it highlights some of the important issues and interests at stake
and underscores the need for a ruling on the issue of whether language
implicates national origin for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Alexander
v. Sandoval was a Title VI case involving a state agency that receives
federal funding.13 ' In this case, the Alabama Department of Public Safety
99. Id. at361.
100. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
101. See, e.g., Alexander, 121 S.Ct. at 1511 (outlining various cases that have rejected
the EEOC guidelines that equate language with national origins); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480, 1487 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that Gutierrez had no precedent authority,
for it was vacated as moot); Brief of Pro-English at *3 n.2.
102. 121 S.Ct. 1511 (2001).
103. Id. at 1523.
104. Id. at 1515.
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curtailed its policy of providing Driver's License exams in various
languages after the state adopted English as the official language of the
state.'1 5 The plaintiff alleged that this policy of administering the exams in
English alone violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal
Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983.106 The district court
issued a preliminary injunction finding the plaintiff had shown a likelihood
of success on the merits as well as irreparable harm.' 0 7 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, specifically equating language with
national origin for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Title VI flatly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin and, in turn, English
language policies that cause a disparate impact on the basis of national
origin. ' °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the issue of whether
there is a private right of action under Title VI.1°9 Nonetheless, various
amici curiae requested the court to consider the issue of whether language
implicates national origin for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
These organizations feel that the issue presented to the Court in Alexander
v. Sandoval necessarily implicated the issue of whether language
discrimination equates with national origin discrimination. The logic is
that if language does not implicate national origin, then there is no cause of
action in the first place. The petitioner, however, did not appeal from the
ruling of the lower courts that equates language with national origin for
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Therefore, the Supreme Court
did not rule on the issue. Alexander v. Sandoval presented an opportunity
for the Court, at least in dicta, to shed substantial light upon how language
should be treated under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII.
Recognizing the potential import of this case for the private
employment sector, various groups submitted amicus curiae briefs urging
the Court to reject the EEOC guidelines that equate language with national
origin. For example, a small company called Beauty Enterprises, Inc., filed
an amicus curiae brief. As stated in their brief, the company employs
approximately 325 employees, with a significant proportion of immigrants
and bilinguals." ° The company has had an English-only workplace rule in
place for more than twenty years."' Beauty Enterprises underscores the
potential ramifications of this case for the private sector: "[A]ny
acknowledgment by this Court that language can and should be equated
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
1908).
111.

Id.
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 487 (11 th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 495.
Alexander, 121 S. Ct. at 1515.
Brief for Beauty Enters., Inc. at *2. See also Alexander, 121 S. Ct. at 1511 (No. 99Brief for Beauty Enters, Inc. at *8.
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with 'national origin' will substantively affect 'the law' to which Beauty
Enterprises and other American companies will have to conform their
workplace practices."' 12 Beauty Enterprises is particularly concerned with
this ruling because a group of fifteen Hispanic employees have filed
disparate impact national origin discrimination charges with the EEOC
based on the existence of the English-only policy. 11 3 What Beauty
enterprises seems most concerned about is having to initially bear the
burden of showing a legitimate business necessity for their English-only
policy, because the crux of their argument is that they have a legitimate
business purpose for their rule. They go to great lengths in their brief to
outline the process the company went through in order to develop the
policy.114 They clearly want to show that they had a problem with morale
and productivity and, after thorough investigation, their founder established
a policy that he felt was necessary for business reasons. This, however,
undermines their argument which is that an employer should not even have
to show a legitimate business purpose for such policies. The following
statement is representative of this argument:
Were this Court to affirm the llth Circuit, employers in BEI's
position-i.e., employers with no intention of doing anything
discriminatory and who simply wish to create a workplace that is
safe and free of ethnic tension for its diverse workforce-would
no longer be able to use a Speak English Only rule to accomplish
these objectives, absent business necessity, as determined by
some outside
agency, either the EEOC and/or a federal district
15
court.

While this statement adequately describes the showing that would be
necessary in order to uphold an English-only policy were the EEOC
guidelines to be adopted, it also contradicts the employer's own argument.
Beauty Enterprises attempts to justify its own policy by saying it had a
legitimate business necessity for its English-only policy, but then argues
Sandoval v. Hagan should be overruled because to affirm the holding
would be to require it to proffer this same legitimate
reason in order to
16
EEOC.
the
or
employee
an
by
challenge
a
sustain
The last statement of the argument section of Beauty Enterprises' brief
reconciles this apparent conflict. The company seems to be arguing that a
business reason as opposed to a business necessity should be enough to
defend an English-only workplace policy. Based on the disparate impact

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.at *7.
Id.at*1l.
Id. at*8-11.
Id. at "8.
Id. at *8, 11-12.
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analysis established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 1 17 various courts have
held that the plaintiff employee who challenges the English-only policy
may provide evidence that there is a less discriminatory method available
that would serve the employer's legitimate interest:
The discretion of the district court in determining whether the
defendant has carried its burden of establishing justification for
acts resulting in discriminatory effects may be guided at the least
by the following rough measures: a justification must serve, in
theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title
VIII defendant, and the defendant must show that no alternative
course of action could be adopted that would enable that interest
to be served with less discriminatory impact."'
Clearly Beauty Enterprises wishes to avoid this inquiry by having the
Court's review end at the first step.
The Court could have determined the question of whether courts and
employers should defer to the EEOC's guidelines regarding English-only
policies. Although this issue was not among the issues for which Certiorari
was sought or granted, amicus curiae raised it in their briefs and it is
implicated in the issue of whether Title VI embodies a private cause of
action as it goes to the question of whether the plaintiff employee has even
asserted a valid cause of action. Beauty Enterprises recognizes the
importance of this case for the determination of the validity of the EEOC's
guidelines: "Specifically, were this Court to affirm the Eleventh Circuit
below, it would effectively ratify the EEOC's Speak English Only rule
guidelines and place its imprimatur on the unwarranted presumption of
discriminatory impact that those guidelines establish."'1 9 Another amicus
curiae brief also recognizes the potential importance of Sandoval for the
judicial validity of the EEOC guidelines. In its brief, Pro English urges the
Court to reject the EEOC guidelines: "This Court has never reviewed those
administrative interpretations, and they do not bind this Court.' 2 ° The
brief goes on to outline the various circuit and district court cases that have
2
rejected the EEOC's guideline that equates language with national origin.1 '
Despite the potential for the Court in Alexander v. Sandoval to clear
up the debate surrounding English-only policies in the workplace, the Court
instead decided the issue by holding that there is no private cause of action

117. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
118. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977) (deciding that, in
light of Griggs, Title VII criteria must develop on a case-by-case basis) (citation omitted).
119. Brief for Beauty Enters., Inc. at *7; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511
(2001) (No. 99-1908).
120. Brief for Pro English at *12; see also Alexander, 121 S. Ct. at 1511 (2001).
121. Brief for Pro English at *12.
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under Title VJ. 122 The issue of language as implicating national origin was
never mentioned in the opinion. Although anything the Court would have
said on the issue would be dicta, the Court's opinion in this case had the
potential to shed light on the Justices' views on the issue of language and
national origin and could have provided guidance for the courts and future
litigants. The Court missed an opportunity to clear up this issue in
Alexander v. Sandoval and the debate remains to be played out in district
courts throughout the country.
V.

CONCLUSION

There remains a clear split in United States courts regarding whether
language implicates national origin for purposes of the Civil Rights Act and
hence whether language policies in the workplace violate Title VII. The
trend in recent years seems to be moving toward the use of psycholinguistic evidence to show that language is not a volitional choice and that,
therefore, policies which punish employees for their use of a language
other than English impose a disparate impact on them. A definitive ruling
on the issue by the Supreme Court, which did not occur in Alexander v.
Sandoval, would vitiate the need to present the same psycho-linguistic
evidence over and over again in order to show that language is not a
volitional choice, but is rather the product of one's national origin and a
psychological phenomena. By showing that language use does not involve
choice, the theory that the volitional choice severs the link between
language and national origin-which some courts have relied on to find that
language does not implicate national origin-would be invalidated. The
result would be that plaintiffs could reach the second stage of the Griggs
analysis and shift the burden to the defendant to show that there is a
legitimate business justification for the rule despite its disparate impact on
certain classes of employees based on national origin. Until there is a
definitive ruling, however, it seems likely that there will continue to be
disagreement among the courts regarding whether or not language
implicates national origin. The best hope for plaintiffs would then seem to
be psycho-linguistic evidence showing that language is not a deliberate
choice and therefore employment practices that punish employees for their
use of their native languages while on the job create a disparate impact on
the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII.

122. Alexander, 121 S. Ct. at 1523.

